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While approximately 90 percent of Pakistan‘s 92 million people are Muslims, the number of Shi‘is among them is unknown. In British India, the Census Department systematically collected and published statistical data about religious and caste affiliation, and the Pakistani government continued the practice after independence in 1947. But the collection of this Information had to be discontinued after minorities, especially the Shi‘is, questioned the political wisdom of knowing and publishing such sensitive statistics. They argued that exact information about the numerical strength of rival communities could be exploited by demagogues to exacerbate sectarian tensions. Since there are no reliable figures, the number of Shi‘is in Pakistan is inevitably open to wide speculation. Some writers, mainly Sunnis, hold that the Shi‘is constitute between 10 and 20 per cent of the Muslim population. Not surprisingly, some Shi‘i writers speak of up to 40 percent. Estimates dissolve ultimately into opinions.

lt is nonetheless certain that the Twelver Shi‘is constitute the overwhelming majority of all Shi‘is in Pakistan. The Isma‘ilis, known on the Indian subcontinent as Aga Khanis or Khojas, are numerically a small community of a few hundred thousand. But along with the Bohras, a sect that also has its roots in lsma‘ilism, they are economically more influential than the rest of the Shi‘i community. The importance of both Khojas and Bohras in banking, trade, and industry, far exceeds their numerical strength. Because of the prominence of Isma‘ilis in the struggle for independence, they warrant inclusion in any study of Shi‘ism and Politics in Pakistan although a more noticeable role has been played in recent years by Twelver Shi‘is.

SHI‘ISM AND THE SUBCONTINENT

The Isma‘ilis were the first Shi‘i group to enter India; an Isma‘ili missionary appeared in Sind as early as the late ninth century. But it was in the time of the Fatimid caliph al-Mu‘izz (953-975) that lsma‘ili missionaries succeeded in converting a local ruler in Sind to their creed. In 985 the city of Multan was firmly in their hands, and the Friday sermon was read in the name of the Fatimid caliph in Cairo; coins were even struck with his insignia. The eradication of the Isma‘ili state was one of the first objectives of Mahmud of Ghazna (999-1030), who conquered Multan in 1005, massacred the Isma‘ilis, and took their ruler prisoner. Their political power was broken, but the Isma‘ili commmunity survived the ca1amity, and lsma‘ilism seems to have been espoused by the Sumra dynasty of Hindu origin. Contact with the Fatimid mission, however, was lost.¹

An Isma‘ili missionary of the Musta‘lian sect was sent in the eleventh century from Yemen to India, and landed in Gombay, Gujarat. The mission was highly successful and a large number of Hindu traders were converted to the sect. This marked the beginnings of the Bohra community which today is very prosperous and well-organized. Bohras form themselves into guilds, avoid intermarriage with other Muslims, and as a rule do not take part in politics. There are two groups of Bohras. The smaller and less important branch is mainly composed of peasants and cultivators. This group embraced Sunnism probably during their persecution by the Sultans of Gujarat in the first half of the fifteenth century. The larger group, which belongs to the merchant class, is Shi‘i. Their head currently resides in Bombay, and has his permanent headquarters in Surat, India.²

Very little can be said authoritatively about the time and circumstances of the arrival in India of the Nizari Isma‘ilis, whose most important representatives today are the Aga Khanis or Khojas. This community had been well-knit but less conspicuous among the Muslim sects before the migration of Aga Khan I Hasan Ali Shah from Persia to India in 1840.³ With the advent of Aga Khan III Sultan Muhammad Shah, who took a great interest in the social and political affairs of Indian Muslims, the community came to play an important political role. After the partition of India in August 1947, many Khojas migrated from Gujarat and Bombay to Pakistan, mainly to Karachi. Most inhabitants of the former Hunza state in northern Pakistan and a majority of those in Chitral are Isma‘ilis. Aga Khani sources put the total number of their community worldwide at 20 million.

The Twelver Shi'is, then, are latecomers to the field, gaining importance only after the Safavids adopted Twelver Shi‘ism as state religion in Iran in the sixteenth century. The Mughal Humayun (153O-1556) is said to have embraced Twelver Shi‘ism during a period of exile in Iran, perhaps to secure the help of the Safavid Shah Tahmasp. Humayun brought with him Iranian Shi‘i officia1s, scholars, and many thousands of soldiers to Delhi. Bayram Khan, the guardian of Humayun‘s son Akbar (1556-1605), possibly held Twelver beliefs, as did Shaykh Gada‘i, who was appointed as Sadr al-Sudur, the highest religious office in the state. Nur Jahan, the wife of Jahangir (1605-1627), was of Iranian descent and a Shi‘i, as were her father and brother, who both came to hold important official posts.⁴ Shi‘is as individuals thus wielded considerable power under the Mughals and excited much jealousy. Sunnis came to feel that Shi‘i power was utilized against their interests, enhancing the animosity which to this day has kept Sunnis and Shi‘is at loggerheads.

Mazhar Janjanan, a contemporary of Shah Wali Allah (1703-1762), was, like the Naqshbandi and the Chishti Sufi orders, a crusader against the Shi‘is. His method of confrontation was to offend the Shi‘is by celebrating special ceremonies to pay homage to the caliphs Abu Bakr and Umar, a polemical rnethod which is still in vogue in Pakistan. The fundamentalist agitator and leader of the jihad movement agaist the Sikh state in Punjab during the nineteenth century, Sayyid Ahmad (1786-1831) of Rai Bareilly, was an ardent preacher against the Shi‘is, declarig them to be beyond the pale of Islam. The British, in their turn sought to prevent sectarian agitation when it threatened public order, and they banned numerous pamphlets and books written by Shi‘is and Sunnis against each other.⁵ Even today, polemical works continue to be published in Pakistan, and the Ministry of Interior frequently issues relevant notices to the newspapers announcing a ban on such books and other published materials.

MUSLIM POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND THE SHI‘IS

At a time when Indian Muslim leaders were distinguished by their political quietism, a young Twelver Shi‘i civil servant, Sayyid Ameer Ali (1849-1928), who was to become a renowned author on Islam in later years, took the bold step of establishing the Central National Muhammedan Association. This initiative, although it proved short-lived, preceded the establishment of the Indian National Congess in 1885 by eight years.⁶ But it fell to Aga Khan III to lay more lasting foundations for Muslim political organization. In 1906, the Aga Khan was asked by leading Muslims to lead a deputation to the Viceroy Lord Minto (1905-1910). At this celebrated audience, the Muslims asked for the abandonment of the franchise on the basis of joint electorates as this subjected Muslim "national interests" to the whim of an "unsympathetic" Hindu majority in many electorates. lt was a telling demand, which presaged Muslim separatism. That same year, Muslim leaders organized the All-India Muslim League; the Aga Khan served as president for the first six years and also stood firmly by the side of the Indian Sunni Muslims on the Khilafat Committee although as a Shi‘i he could not personally recognize the Ottoman sultan as the caliph of all Muslims. His motive in joining hands with the Sunnis was to spare Muslim political power yet further erosion. In 1928, Indian Muslims once again turned to the Aga Khan for guidance in a moment of despair and anxiety: They had lost their confidence in the Indian National Congress, and their own ranks were split. The Aga Khan presided over the All-Parties Muslim Conference, which sought to unify the position of the Muslims, and he led the Muslim delegations to the First and the Second Round Table Conferences in 1930 and 193l in London.

The Muslim movement became avowedly separatist in 1940, when the All-India Muslim League met in Lahore and adopted a resolution demanding an independent Muslim state of Pakistan. At the head of the struggle for Pakistan stood a Khoja, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), upon whom the Muslim masses bestowed the title of Quaid-e Azam, the ,,greatest leader."⁷ Jinnah had gathered around him a devoted team of leading Muslims, which included Sunnis as well as Shi‘is. Among them were the Raja Amir Ahmad Khan of Mahmudabad, a Twelver Shi‘i, and Ismail I. Chundrigar, a Khoja from Bombay.

PAKISTAN AND THE SHI‘IS

The majority of the Indian Shi‘is backed the demand for Pakistan, and they subsequently migrated to Pakistan in large numbers from practically all parts of the subcontinent. Many Shi‘is expected that with independence, they would win full recognition as the equals of their Sunni compatriots. The majority of the Shi‘is, including Jinnah, as well as many Sunnis, had envisioned a democratic and secular Pakistan, in which sectarian differences would count for naught. But the Shi‘is soon realized that the Sunni ulama would be difficult partners. Most of them had bitterly opposed the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan but were now compelled to migrate to the new Muslim state. There they found to their distress that Western-educated urban elites were preparing a democratic constitution which would leave Pakistan a national, secular state, which merely happened to have a Muslim majority. The ulama wanted a decisive say in defining the essence of the new state; Pakistan, they said, must be governed according to the principles of lslam.⁹

The tensions broke the surface in 1963, when over 100 clashes in different parts of the country took place between Sunnis and Shi‘is. Such communal disturbances had occurred occasionally since the establishment of Pakistan as they had in pre-independence India. The Shi‘i processions during the month of Muharram and the public Shi‘i vituperation of the caliphs Abu Bakr and Umar have always carried with them the potential for violence. But the early 1960s saw an intensification of this mutual animosity as the Sunni ulama pressed their demands for an Islamic state that conformed solely to their vision. The Shi‘is, in response, began to organize politically.

The first All-Pakistan Shi‘a Convention was assembled in January 1953 by the Idara Tahaffuz-e Huquq-e Shi‘a (Organization for Safeguarding the Rights of the Shi‘is). The demands made at that conference were still unfulfilled in 1964 when an All-Pakistan Shi‘a Ulama Conference met. A resolution passed at the conference called for ,,full safeguards for our majalis and processions"; Hafiz Kifayat Husayn said that azadari - the public mourning for the martyred Imam Husayn was ,,a question of life and death for the Shi'as," and ,,a matter of the utmost importance for the Shi‘as who considered it to be the ,nerve center' of all their activities."¹⁰ Another issue which concerned the Shi‘i community was the combined religious education of Shi‘i and Sunni children. ,,Partiality" in the schools towards the rnajority sect, they stated, had caused ,,Irritation among the Shi‘as of Pakistan."¹¹ Shi‘i religious leaders went so far as to demand a separate syllabus of Islamic studies for Shi‘i students.¹² In August 1964, the All-Pakistan Shi‘a Conference met again, this time to oppose the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Amendment Bill of 1964. A resolution was passed stating that the Bill - allowing a childless widow to inherit the agricultural land of her deceased husband - was against the Shi‘i interpretation of the Quran. If passed, they said, "it would strike a blow to the unity and solidarity of the country."¹³

The Shi‘is were emboldened in this campaign by the candidature of the sister of the founder of Pakistan, Fatima Jinnah, for the presidency. The Opposition parties, including the religions groups, which normally denied the fitness of women for leading public roles in society and politics, had rallied behind her and made her the candidate of the united Opposition to President Ayub Khan (1958-1969). The ruling party was taken aback, and especially wished to deprive Ms. Jinnah of the backing of the Shi‘i community. The government proposed talks with Shi‘i representatives, and these were held in November 1964.¹⁴ Shi‘i leaders met with Ayub Khan and presented him with a written memorandum containing the demands of the Shi‘i community;¹⁵ Ayub Khan, eager to please, suggested the establishment of a commitee the of Shi‘i representatives and govemment officials, to investigate Shi‘i grievances.¹⁶ The Idara Tahaffuz-e Huquq-e Shi‘a then announced that the Shi‘is of Pakistan were free to support any presidential candidate, having thus made the most of Ms. Jinnah's ill-fated candidature. For the first time, the Shi‘is had organized with some effectiveness to make their grievances known.

SHI‘IS SHARE IN POWER

Ayub Khan was succeeded in March 1969 by General Agha Yahya Khan (1969-1971), a Shi‘i by confession. He, in turn, handed over power in December 1971 (after the East Pakistan debacle) to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1971-77), who was reputed to be a Shi‘i and was certainly a protege of the former president Iskandar Mirza (1955-58). Mirza was a Shi‘i himself and had married a Shi‘i woman of Persian descent. lt was through Mirza that Ayub Khan came to know young Bhutto, who had no political or administrative experience at that time but was included by Ayub Khan in his martial Iaw team of ministers. Bhutto's second wife, Nusrat, also hailed from the Iranian colony of Karachi.

Shi‘is could now directly approach Bhutto through bis wife, strengthening their position. And during the initial years of his rule there were no untoward incidents involving the Shi‘is. Even the Muharram celebrations of the Shi‘i community took place in an atmosphere of peace and tranquility, as evidenced by this report of the ta’ziya¹⁷ procession in Karachi in 1973:

The Shi‘is saw in this event an opportunity to press their own demands, particularly for a separate Islamics syllabus for Shi‘i students. Bhutto did not wish to become embroiled in yet another conntroversy, and a cabinet commmittee consisting of two ministers was nominated to negotiate with the Shi‘is. It was agreed in the parleys that, beginning with the school Session which opened in April 1975, a separate Islamics syllabus for Shi‘is would be introduced.²⁰ The reaction of the Sunnis, particularly in Karachi, was prompt. Special meetings for paying homage to the caliphs Abu Bakr and Umar were organized in January l975.²¹ But the Shi‘is had won an important concession, and under Bhutto they came to feel that their position had been much improved.

ZIA UL-HAQ AND THE SHI‘IS

The seizure of power by General Zia in July 1977 was generally regarded with ominous apprehension by the Shi‘i community. In order to perpetuate his rule, Zia soon announced the introduction of Islamic law in Pakistan, and the Shi‘is grew alarmed, for the implementation of these measures threatened to place them at the mercy of the Sunni ulama. In early 1979, while Iran was swept by Islamic revolution, the Shi‘is of Pakistan prepared to confront the military junta.

The Shi‘i protest was directed against the proclamation of Islamic law according to the Hanafi Fiqh, as well as against the high-handed attitude of General Zia, who had ordered that a unified syllabus for Sunni and Shi‘i students be taught in schools. The Shi‘is of Pakistan asked Khomeini to intervene. His message, which was read in a protest meeting, called upon the Government of Pakistan to ensure treatment for Shi‘is equal to that of their Sunni compatriots. Zia told a delegation of Shi‘is that he would abide by this advice, and would accept the application of Shi‘i personal law to Shi‘is. But in all other matters, he determined that one lsamic law should hold sway, and that was necessarily based upon Hanafi Fiqh.²²

The proclamation of Zakat tax on wealth and Ushr tax on agricultural produce in 1979-80 brought the Shi‘i protest to a head. Shi‘is maintained that zakat should be paid on a voluntary basis and that the rate of tax on agriculture produce was lower according to the Ja‘fari Fiqh.²³ Moreover, the Shi‘is maintained, lslamic taxes should properly be paid to representatives of the Shi‘i Imam and not to the state. The govemment had ordered deduction of Zakat at the rate of two and a half per cent from all bank accounts on June 30, 1980. This brought the Shi‘is out in the streets, particularly in Islamabad, where over 100,000 people comptetely blocked all traffic to the ministries for three days in July 1980. Demonstrators even threatened to occupy the ministries. Zia's military regime, which otherwise acted with brutality to crush demonstrations, found its hands tied in this case - for at least one corps commander is said to have had threatened to occupy the military general headquarters in Rawaiptndi, should any action against the Shi‘i demonsrrators be taken. Zia had no choice but to negotiate with the Shi‘i leaders and finally gave the Shi‘is the Option of claiming the deducted Zakat rnoney back and paying their Zakat as well as Ushr on a voluntary basis through Shi‘i communal organizations.²⁴

Yet this was by no means the end of Shi‘i protest. The events of 1980 had led a leading Shi‘i divine, Mufti Ja‘far Husayn, to establish the Tehrik-e Nifaz-e Fiqh-e Ja‘fariyya (Movement for the lntroduction of the Ja‘fari Fiqh). lt was this organization which reached a signed accord with the government on July 6, 1980, providing for a constitutional remedy to the dilemma. And in fact, in September 1980, an ,,explanation" was attached to an article in Pakistan's constitution, which allowed some latitude in the application of lslamic personal law. But this did not meet the expectations of the Shi‘i community that were generated by the signing of the July 6 agreement. In August 1982, Shi‘i divines from throughout Pakistan met in Murree to discuss the various challenges facing their community. Mufti Ja‘far Husayn announced that the government had not fulfilled its promises to the Shi‘i communlty and threatened that Shi‘i leaders would launch a country-wide movement if their demands were not accepted. These included equal representation for Shi‘is in various Islamic bodies, such as the Islamic Research Institute, the Council of Islamic Ideology, and the Federal Council (Majlis-e Shura), and tbe abolition of declaration forms for non-deduction of Zakat by Shi’is.²⁵ These demands remained unfulfilled in July 1984, although, accordhg to a Shi‘i leader, General Zia had promised absolute implementation of the Ja‘fari Fiqh.²⁶

Consequently, many Shi‘is boycotted the referendum in December 1984 and the general elections in February 1985. On both occasions huge processions were organized by radical Shi‘i factions against the govemment. The movement had taken a militant turning upon the death of Mufti Ja‘far Husayn, who was succeeded by Allama Arif Husayn al-Husayni. In a lecture before the general congress of the Imamiyah Organization in Punjab, he condemned the statement of the United States ambassador to Pakistan, in which the ambassador had explicitly approved the policies of President Zia.²⁷ By early 1985, Shi‘i protests more frequently took the Form of militant confrontations with the authorities. Protest processions were repeatedly organized against the October 1, 1984 amendment to the Police Act, under which district superintendents of police were authorized to cancel permission for azadari. The protests were preceded by the offering of Special prayers, beseeching God‘s help in combatting the excesses committed by the authorities.²⁸

Relations between Sunnis and Shi‘is have usually been troubled on the Indian subcontinent, and at present they are at their lowest ebb. The Sunni ulama, who see their Vision of an Islamic Pakistan within grasp, believe that the government bas been far too lenient with tbe Shi‘is, and that it has essentially submitted to Sbi'i blackmail. The Sunni ulama were particular1y angered by a side effect of the government‘s decision to allow the Shi‘is to claim their deducted Zakat rnoney back; The number of persons who have filed such claims is considerably higher than the supposed number of Shi‘i account holders in the country.²⁹ Some Sunni divines have repeately demanded a ban on Shi‘i publications ,,containing rnalicious material against the companions of the Holy Prophet"³⁰. They also demand that all Muharrarn celebrations of the Shi‘is, particularly the Ashura procession, during which self-flagellating Shi‘is parade through city streets, should be banned, A Sunni declaration urged that Pakistan learn from other Mustim countries - an apparent reference to Saudi Arabia - where there is no tradition or practice of allowing such processions in public.³¹ A coalition of Sunni religious organizations in Karachi called for a day-long shutdown of markets and transport to press their demands for curbs on Shi‘is, including a ban on traditional Shi‘i mournig processions.³²

Now that the Ahmadiyya question has been resolved, Sunni fundamentalists seem poised to launch a similar assault on the position of Shi‘is. They argue that the Shi‘is are in many ways more remote from true Islamic teachings than the Ahmadis; the Barelwis in particular, as well as some other groups, who speak of themselves as the Sawad-e Azam (the Great Majority), do not regard Shi‘is as Muslims.³³ Many other religious groups will surely side with them if and when a movement is launched. On the opposing side, resentment among the Shi‘is has been fueled by the success of the Sunni zealots in filling the vacuum created by the absence of democratic institutions, and in imposing much of their brand of Islam upon the country.³⁴ The Sunni-Shi‘i street violence which has plagued Karachi since 1983, resulting in fatalities, arson, damage, and hundreds of arrests, is a symptom of this much intensified animosity.

In July 1985, that animosity produced an unprecedented violence. The Tehrik-e Tahaffuz-e Fiqh-e Jafariyya had taken to marking July 6 as an annual day of protest against the govemment's failure to implement Ja‘fari Fiqh in accord with the agreement signed on that date in 1980. Because of sectarian tensions in Karachi, Allama Arif Husayn chose to hold the protest demonstration in Quetta. Local authorities there banned a public procession; when demonstrators defied the ban and poured into the street from their meeting place, a clash ensued with the Police. Both sides were armed, and nearly 30 people died in the confrontation. Prominent Shi‘i leaders were immediatly detained, among them Allama Arif Husayn. Only two weeks before the Quetta incident, the govenment had come to an agreement with a faction of Shi‘is under Sayyid Hamid Ali Shah Musavi, which provided for the appointment of a committee composed of cabinet ministers and religious scholars of all Schools, to look into Shi‘i demands. But Allama Arif Husayn and his followers rejected the proposal. By its composition, the committee would also include Sunni ulama, and many were the Shi‘is who felt that their demands concerned fundamental religious principles, implementation of which could not be made subject to Sunni approval.³⁵

IRAN AND THE SHI‘IS IN PAKISTAN

Contacts have always existed between the Shi‘i community on the Indian Subcontinent and the Shi‘i religious establishment in Iran and Iraq. The late Ayatollah Mohammad Husayn Borujerdi of Qom was generally accepted as highest religious authority by Indian and Pakistani Shi‘is. After his death, the Pakistani Shi‘i divines decided to accept the religious leadership of Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim of Najaf, who was then succeeded by Ayatollah Abol Qasem Khoi, also of Najaf. Many of Pakistan‘s Shi‘is have recently transferred their allegiance to Ayatollah Khomeini, whose personal representatives have visited Pakistan to meet and guide Shi‘i sympathizers. The Islamic Republic of Iran has also shown a keen interest in affairs of the Shi‘is of Pakistan, expressed through its diplomatic representatives and the branches of the Iran Institute (Farhang-e Iran) in the major cites of the country. This institution was initially established by tbe Pahlavi regime to teach Persian to Pakistanis and to disseminate information about Iranian culture. Since the Islamic Revolution, the aims and purposes of the Iran Institute have been transformed, and it now emphasizes the religio-political message radiated by Islamic Iran to the rest of the Muslim world.

The lengths to which Iranian diplomats are presently prepared to go was demonstrated in 1983 by the Iranian consul-general in Karachi. Severe clashes between Shi‘is and Sunnis afflicted the city in 1983; the dispute ostensibly revolved around whether a certain piece of property was intended for a Shi‘i shrine (imambara) or a Sunni rnosque. Later it became known that the intelligence services had secretly made films of Shi‘i meetings, to which the Iranian consul-general had delivered provocative speeches. The government of Pakistan was contemplating the expulsion of the diplomat, but he left the country on his own accord in order to avoid an eclat.³⁶ Iran, in turn, claimed that the strife was the result of imperialist intrigue) and Iran's ambassador to Pakistan visited Karachi to distribute a Fatwa by Khomeini on the need for Sunni-Shi‘i unity. But while Iran undoubtedly regretted the violence, it had deliberately done much to stir the Shi‘i community - so much so that some Shi‘i communal leaders decided to distance themselves from Iran in apprehension lest the Shi‘is come to be regarded as an Iranian fifth column.

Iran's Islamic Revolution still enjoys the sympathy of many within Pakistan's Shi‘i community. But the Shi‘i struggle in Pakistan has been directed not at transforming the country into an Iranian-style Islamic republic, but at guaranteeing Shi‘i freedom from Sunni coercion. In Pakistan, the Shi‘i question is a minority question, setting obvious limits to forms of Shi‘i protest. Shi‘i fundamentalists well know that the model of Iran is not one which they can emulate without forging an alliance with those same Sunni fundamentalists who now excoriate them. Enthusiasm for Iran's Revolution was initially widespread in some Sunni circles; leaders of the Jama‘at-e Islami, the foremost Sunni fundamentalist party, as well as other Sunni groups, trekked to Tehran to meet the revlutionaries and catch a glimpse of Khomeini.. Since then a disillusionment has set in, the result of Iran's implicitly Shi‘i bias in dealing with other Muslim peoples. Even the Sunni Pakistani who has most wholeheartedly embraced Iran's cause - Kalim Siddiqui, Director of the Muslim Institute in London - has determined that ,,the Is1amic state of Iran has in a sense yet to emerge from its Iranian and Shi‘i shell."³⁷ Far from engendering Muslim unity, Iran's Revolution, like Zia's Islamization policy, has served to underline those differences which have long divided Shi‘is and Sunnis on the subcontinent.
 
 

NOTES

l On this subject, see Samuel Stern, ,,Isma‘ili Propaganda and Fatimid Rule in Sind," in his "Studies in Early Isma’ilism" (Jerusalem and Leiden, 1983), 177-88. The Isma‘ilis are believed to have briefly reestablished themselves in Multan after the death of Mahmud of Ghazna.

2. See T. Lokhandwalla, ,,The Bohras, a Muslim Community of Gujrat," Studia lslamica (1955) 3: 117-35.

3. See Azim Nanji, The Nizari Isma‘ili Tradition in the Indo-Pakistani Subcontinent (Delmar, NY, 1978); and Hamid Algar, ,,The Revolt of the Aqa Khan Mahallati and the Transference of the Isma‘ili Imamate to India," Studia Islamica (1969) 29: 55-81.

4. For a fuller discussion of the impact of Safavid Iran upon Mughal India, see Riazul Islam, "Indo-Persian Re1ations: A Study of the Political and Diplomatic Relations between the Mughul Empire and Iran" (Tehran, 1970).

5. N. Gerald Barrier, "Banned: Controversial Literature and Political Control in lndia, 1907-1947" (Missouri, 1974), 202-3.

6. See K.K. Aziz, ed. "Ameer Ali: His Life and Work" (Lahore, 1968).

7. Dr Safdar Mahmood (Islamabad) has drawn my attention to a current controversy as to whether Jinnah adhered to Sunnism, a claim for which Dr Mahmood has adduced some interesting evidence. The High Court of Sind decided in 1976 that both Muhammad Ali as well as Fatima Jinnah were Shi‘is. Recently, the division bench of the same court has partly revised its earlier decision. Now it holds that, unlike Fatima Jinnah, who was indeed a Shi‘i, her brother was ,,a true Muslim free from any sectarian feelings, sentiments and faith." Dawn (Karachi), Apr. 12, 1985; Pakistan Times Overseas (Lahore), Apr. 21, 1985.

8. Chundrigar was a member of the pre-partition interim government in 1946-47as a representative of the All-India Muslim League. After independence, he served as Pakistan's Ambassador in Kabul and as governor of two provinces, before becoming prime minister for a period of just over six weeks in 1957.

9, See Munir D. Ahmed, ,,Pakistan: The Dream of an Islamic State." in Carlo Caldarola, ed. "Religion and Societies: Asia and the Middle East" (Amsterdam, 1982), 261-88.

10. Morning News (Karachi), Jan. 8, 1964.

11. Ibid., Jan. 4, 1964.

12. Ibid., Mar. 2, 1964; Apr. 22, 1964.

13. Ibid., Aug. 30, 1964.

14. Ibid., Oct. 10, 1964.

15. Ibid., Dec 6, 1964.

16. Ibid., Nov.30, 1964.

17. Commemorative model of the Imam Husayn's tomb, which leads the procession. For details, see the article by Keith Hjortshoj: in this volume.

18. Dawn, Feb. 16, 1973.

19. See Munir D. Ahmed, ,,Ausschluss der Ahmadiyya aus dem Islam. Eine umstrittene Entscheidung des pakistanischen Parlaments," Orient (March 1975) 16(1): 112-43.

20. Dawn, Oct. 14, 1974.

21. Ibid., Jan. 14, 1975.

22. See ,,General Zias Islamisierungsprogram für Pakistan. Schwierigkeiten und Widerstände," Neue Zürcher Zeitung (hereafter: NZZ), March 29, 1979.

23. Tax an agricu1ture produce is five percent according to the Ja‘fari Fiqh, whereas all four Sunni schools of Fiqh set the rate at ten percent (as denoted by the very name of the tax).

24. "Probleme der Islamisierung. Opposition der Schiiten in Pakistan. Der Protest gegen Steuern," NZZ, July 16, 1980.

25. Dawn, Aug. 5, 1982.

26. Ibid., July 5, 1984.

27. Tehran Times, Mar. 25, 1985.

26. Dawn, Apr. 4, 1985.

29. A similar episode unfolded after Bhutto's government banned akoholic beverages for Muslims. In the City of Lahore alone, some 4,000 applications were filed with the alcohol licensing office, the applicants claiming that they were members of the Ahmadiyya community, which had been declared a non-Mustim minority. Probably none ef these applicants was a genuine member of the communitv, which in fact strictly observes the Islamic injunction regarding alcohl. In a subsequent order, the government expressly included members of the Ahmadiyya commnunity in the category of those to whom the prohbition applied.

30. Dawn, Feb.15, 1983.

31. Ibid., Oct. 12, 1984.

32, Ibid., Oct. 14, 1984.

33. Barelwis are followers of Ahmad Riza Khan (d.1921), a native of Bareily (India). The community itseif is called "Hizb al-Ahnaf". Unlike other Sunnis, they believe that the Prophet Muhammad possessed prescience, and that he was composed of light and was hence shadowless.

34. International Herald Tribune (Paris), March 26-27, 1983.

35. For the government's point of view, see Dawn, July 12, 1985; for Allama Arif Husayn's, see Haidar (Rawalpindi), July 30, 1985.

36. Dawn, Feb. 15, 1983.

37.Kalim Siddiqui, ,,Islamic Iran has Global Responsibilities," Crescent International (Toronto), Feb. 1-15, 1984.